In modern air combat, information superiority is as decisive as weapon range or aircraft performance. The Swedish Radar-Samverkan concept — a cooperative sensor employment strategy enabled by the Tactical Information Data Link System (TIDLS) — embodies this principle. By fusing radar, Infrared Search and Track (IRST), and Electronic Support Measures (ESM) data from multiple Gripens, the system promises high-quality tracking with minimal electromagnetic exposure. However, as the “Broken Link” scenario demonstrates, reliance on a single cooperative network introduces vulnerabilities. When faced with coordinated electronic warfare (EW) and adversary tactical exploitation, the very network that provides advantage can become the decisive point of failure.
1. Scramble & Takeoff
A. F 17 Wing, Kallinge — Swedish/NATO Perspective
The scramble horn echoed across the hardened shelters, its metallic tone cutting through the cold Baltic air. Captain Erik “Blaze” Norrman vaulted into his Gripen E’s cockpit, the ground crew already feeding the Mission Data Cartridge (MDC) into the avionics bay. The MIL-STD-1553B and ARINC 429 buses began transferring mission data — Digital Map System (DMS) overlays, pre-loaded IFF tables, EW threat libraries, and radar emission schedules for Radar-Samverkan.
Erik configured his Wide Area Display (WAD) for split-screen: left half displaying the tactical radar feed, right half the DMS navigation with terrain overlay for later terrain masking if needed. Ghost 21, 22, 23, and 24 were briefed into their roles: Ghost 21 and 23 would be illuminators, running short, offset-frequency bursts; Ghost 22 and 24 would remain passive receivers, using ESM and Skyward-G IRST to build their picture via the Tactical Information Data Link System (TIDLS).
B. Savasleyka Air Base — Russian Perspective
On the eastern edge of Belarus, a mixed package of six aircraft roared into the morning haze — four Su-30SM Flanker-Hs and two Su-34 Fullbacks from the 47th Mixed Aviation Regiment. Major Ivan “Berkut” Sidorov, leading the Su-30s, listened as the A-50U Mainstay AWACS relayed NATO fighter launches from Swedish territory. The mission: intercept and force identification in the Baltic approaches.
The Su-34s were not just bombers today — their L-175V Khibiny-M ECM suites were configured for escort jamming. This meant they could direct broadband noise and deception signals into NATO’s data links and radars, focusing on high-value systems like TIDLS.
2. First Contact
A. Swedish/NATO
At 180 km out, the E-3 Sentry orbiting near Gotland fed initial tracks into Ghost formation over Link 16. Erik’s WAD lit up with six contacts in two groups. Radar-Samverkan unfolded as trained — Ghost 21 and 23 began 2-second LPI bursts on staggered timing, while Ghost 22 and 24 stayed dark, their passive sensors feeding detections to the rest of the flight.
B. Russian
Berkut’s KS-O-2-01 ESM suite detected the faint, irregular LPI spikes. Normally, these would be hard to exploit — but his EW officer noticed the emission intervals were consistent. “Pattern… two illuminators alternating,” he muttered. The Khibiny-Ms onboard the Su-34s locked onto these bursts, injecting wideband noise and false track pulses into the TIDLS frequency bands.
3. Jamming Breakthrough — Data Link Dependency Exposed
A. Swedish/NATO
It happened suddenly. The passive aircraft’s WAD symbology froze — Ghost 22’s contact markers stuck in place, Ghost 24’s entire track overlay vanished. The TIDLS mesh was being saturated with noise; its LOS (Line-of-Sight) dependency meant no alternative routing if a direct link was jammed. Without the illuminator feeds, passive aircraft were effectively blind, relying only on their own narrow IRST field of view.
Erik realized instantly: without cooperative tracking, his Meteor employment envelope would shrink. But the doctrine was built on shared track data — Radar-Samverkan wasn’t designed for prolonged solo operation against multiple high-speed groups.
B. Russian
From Berkut’s perspective, the jamming was doing its job. The alternating illuminators now stood out in the ESM log as two discrete sources. This predictability made them priority targets. He armed R-27ER semi-active radar homing missiles, knowing the illuminators’ need to radiate made them vulnerable.
4. Multi-Bogey Strain & Formation Complexity
A. Swedish/NATO
The E-3 Sentry reported that the second group — the Su-34s — was maneuvering independently. Ghost 21 and 23 had to split their emission cycles between both hostile groups, halving the track refresh rate for each. This created radar gaps, and Erik’s WAD began showing intermittent “track quality degraded” warnings.
High pilot workload set in — managing emission timing, countermeasure programming, and fuel state while avoiding radar overexposure in the Su-30’s Irbis-E kill zone. The mission planning precision of the pre-briefed roles now felt like a constraint; mid-air role reassignment under jamming pressure was clumsy at best.
B. Russian
Berkut saw his chance. With the NATO illuminators switching beams between groups, his radar warning receiver tracked their arcs, and the Mainstay fed him exact timing. The Su-30SMs rolled in for a long-range missile exchange, using Lofted R-27ER profiles to push the Gripens defensive at over 80 km.
5. Breakdown of the Ghost Net
A. Swedish/NATO
Erik launched a Meteor in single-ship mode against a Su-30 at 68 km. But without cooperative mid-course guidance, the missile relied solely on its own seeker after initial loft — the probability of kill dropped sharply as the Su-30 executed beaming maneuvers and dumped chaff.
Ghost 23 called out “Defensive! R-27 inbound!” The illuminator roles were now liabilities; both 21 and 23 had to break formation, diving into terrain masking runs over the Baltic’s low coastal cliffs. The DMS terrain overlay helped Erik hug the contours, but LOS to the rest of the formation broke entirely, killing what little TIDLS capacity remained.
B. Russian
Berkut’s R-27ER missed by a few hundred meters, but it forced the Gripens low and defensive — exactly the desired effect. The Khibiny-M kept up its jamming wall, ensuring no clean re-establishment of Swedish radar cooperation. The Mainstay’s voice over comms was confident: “Targets in retreat, mission area clear.”
6. Disengagement & Return
A. Swedish/NATO
Ghost formation limped home, fuel margins tight after prolonged afterburner use in defensive maneuvers. On landing, Erik noted the bitter reality: a system designed for network-centric advantage had been turned into a liability when that network was denied.
B. Russian
Berkut’s package reformed over Kaliningrad’s airspace, the Su-34s powering down their jammers. The debrief en route was simple: the enemy’s cooperative radar net had been severed in under five minutes, and from there, the engagement shifted entirely in Russian favor.
7. Post-Mission Debrief
A. NATO Debrief — Kallinge
The After-Action Review (AAR) concluded that Radar-Samverkan (Radar Cooperation) was effectively neutralized under coordinated Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). The Tactical Information Data Link System (TIDLS) proved susceptible to broadband noise injection, while its Line-of-Sight (LOS) dependency was further hindered by terrain masking. The wide formation separation created blind sectors when the link was jammed, and tracking multiple hostile groups caused track refresh rates to drop. Additionally, the enemy exploited predictable emitter timing patterns. The review recommended integrating anti-jam TIDLS waveforms, implementing dynamic emitter scheduling to avoid pattern exploitation, and expanding Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) gateway capability for better interoperability with non-Gripen coalition aircraft.
B. Russian Debrief — Savasleyka
The 47th Mixed Aviation Regiment’s Electronic Warfare (EW) analysts concluded that the JAS 39 Gripen formation’s emission pattern predictability was the primary vulnerability enabling their defeat. By identifying the alternating illuminator/passive cycle used in Radar-Samverkan, the regiment employed the L-175V Khibiny-M (Digital Radio Frequency Memory – DRFM) electronic countermeasure suite on the Su-34 Fullback aircraft to inject deceptive and broadband jamming signals, effectively blinding the Gripens’ Tactical Information Data Link System (TIDLS). The after-action recommendation emphasized training pilots and EW operators to rapidly detect and classify emission-role aircraft within cooperative radar tactics, prioritize them for engagement, and employ mixed Su-30SM Flanker-H / Su-34 ECM escort teams to force the enemy into defensive maneuvers, thereby collapsing their network-centric situational awareness and eliminating their coordinated radar advantage.
8. Conclusion
The “Broken Link” engagement underscores a critical lesson: a networked sensor system is only as strong as its resilience under electronic attack. Radar-Samverkan’s strength lies in cooperative tracking and EMCON discipline, but when its data link is denied or degraded, the system reverts to individual platform capabilities — often at a disadvantage against numerically superior or well-coordinated adversaries.
Mitigating these weaknesses demands anti-jam waveform development, dynamic emitter scheduling to prevent pattern exploitation, and cross-platform data link integration to ensure coalition fighters can reinforce the network. In the era of contested electromagnetic spectrum warfare, survival will hinge not just on stealth or speed, but on the ability to keep the link alive when the enemy tries hardest to break it.
Note: This story is entirely fictional and does not reflect any real-life events, military operations, or policies. It is a work of creative imagination, crafted solely for the purpose of entertainment engagement. All details and events depicted in this narrative are based on fictional scenarios and have been inspired by open-source, publicly available media. This content is not intended to represent any actual occurrences and is not meant to cause harm or disruption.
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